Saturday, January 23, 2010

China Explores Position in Straits of Malacca With Fleet Visits

China's guided missile frigates Zhoushan (FFG-529) and Xuzhou (FFG-530) paid visit to Malaysia and Singapore respectively in December 2009. While frigate Zhoshan would visit Singapore, frigate Xuzhou would visit Malaysia. The visit of Chinese frigate to Malaysia gave people a subtle meaning as if China wanted to ascertain the existence of the Straits of Malacca. This would be China's first fleet visit to Malaysia after a break of nine years. The last Chinese navy fleet visit to Malaysia was in July 2000. It was the Shenzhen destroyer (code name 167).
Foreign diplomats told China Press that it was unusual for China to split its frigates from the same third naval fleet escort team to visit Singapore and Malaysia separately. They said that in a subtle way China intended to explore the actual condition in Straits of Malacca. They said such an arrangement for two fleets to visiting two different localities was not very common.
Some diplomats from Tokyo also remarked that "The visit of Chinese fleet to Malaysia was very interesting!" This was because when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Malaysia on 11 November 2009, he had made a special request to visit Malacca and to look at the Straits of Malacca. When President Hu Jintao concluded his 'look' at the Straits of Malacca, he left with this remarks, "When we see it, we will believe it." During that period, this remark by President Hu has stirred up considerable imaginary space of many observers.
"Zhoushan" and "Xuzhou" warships belong to the third Chinese naval escort fleet on its return journey after carrying out an escort mission against pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The third escort fleet team also has a supply ship called "Qiandaohu." All the three fleets belong to China navy's East Sea Fleet team.

The Reasons
After China's fleet visit to Malaysia, some diplomats did come out with some questions of why China would suddenly pay attention to the Straits of Malacca. First, they want to know the factors that trigger China suddenly paying attention to the Straits of Malacca. This is because in the past, although China did pay attention to the Straits of Malacca but they did not carry out actual actions such as paying fleet visit to the littoral states. Second, after President Hu Jintao took a closer look at the Straits of Malacca and said," we see it, we believe it," they want to know what does President Hu believe in? What will be China's new position on the Straits of Malacca?
In fact, in response to all these questions, as early as in May 2009, a Beijing diplomat has already indicated to me that with the stabilization of cross-straits relations, what China wanted to pay attention was the development in the Straits of Malacca. To China, the situation in South China Sea has become secondary important. The informed source told me more than once about this new trend in China in more than one occasion when we met.
As such, the China fleet visit to the Malaysia and its sailing through the Straits of Malacca is a way China wanted to say to the region that the existence of Straits of Malacca is meaningful to China. President Hu Jintao's inspection of the Straits of Malacca at an arranged platform seems to tell the world community that the existence of the Straits of Malacca has practical value to China. If needs arise, China would take political action to assume its duty to protect the security of the Straits of Malacca. Such action would also be in line with China's belief in "advantage boundary."

Military Cooperation With Southeast Asian Nations
Indication shows that China is keen to strengthen military cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. China and Thailand have a plan to carry out military exercise in 2010 although the scale of this military cooperation is not very big. Besides, China's military equipment can also be found in East Timor. East Timor has introduced two Chinese 'Shanghai Class' military petrol vessels. Such development seems to confirm with the reality that "wherever there is strategic resource, there will always be a third force to export its military weapon there." East Timor's relationship with China can be similar to China's relationship with some African countries. This is because East Timor has oil reserves that China can use.
With China's guided missile frigates Zhoushan (FFG-529) and Xuzhou (FFG-530) paid officially visit to the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca, it serves to confirm that China indeed is now making effort to strengthen its military cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.
However, the question is, why did not China allow its Xuzhou navy fleet to participate in the LIMA (Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition) 2009 held in Langkawi Island from 1 to 5 December? Could it be that the time was not right? Could it be that China has deliberately tried to avoid its presence? Or could it be that China would want to use another platform for its fleet presence to the region in the coming days?

Implication of Hu Jintao's Statement
Moreover, during President Hu Jintao's official visit to Malaysia and as President Hu Jintao looked at the Straits of Malacca and told his official visiting team and other representatives that "seeing is believing," what could President Hu's statement mean? When a national leader from a big nation came out with such a statement publicly, it would certainly carry some significant meaning
"What made China paying more attention to the Straits of Malacca now? What did President Hu Jintao believe when he faced the Malacca Straits?"
At the LIMA 09 event, we shared views with foreign diplomats and strategist specialists of the implication of Hu's Malacca Straits statement. However, we could not come out with a solid conclusion. Perhaps the intention of Hu was to give the region an "imagination space." The first episode of this 'imagination space' was perhaps the visit of Chinese fleet Suzhou to the Malacca Straits. Nevertheless, if there is really a second episode of "imagination space" coming out from China about the Straits of Malacca, we hope this second episode of imaginary space is when China upholds its "maritime harmony" proposal to create a 'beautiful Straits of Malacca." Above all, we do not want to see the emergence of a new maritime power turning the region into a platform for military strategic game. This is because the control of Straits of Malacca affairs reminds in the hands of the littoral states that comprise of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand.

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