Iran’s Nuclear Programme

Iran’s nuclear issue has once again been brought to the fore with the key European Countries’ proposal meant to enlist the support of Russia and China for the possible UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, should Iran refuse to abandon uranium enmeshment. The compromise which would drop the automatic threat of military action of Iran remains defiant—is part of a proposed basket of incentives meant to entice Iran to give up enrichment, a possible way to nuclear arms. It also spelt out the penalties if it does not. It is worth pointing out that Russia and China have opposed calls by the US, the UK and France
for a resolution threatening sanctions and enforceable by military action. If Iran remains defiant, the proposal calls for a Security Council resolution imposing sanctions under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter. But it avoids any reference to Article 42—which is the trigger for possible military action to enforce any such resolution.

The Purpose
Iran’s attachment to nuclear development is rooted in its own tumultuous history. The Islamic Republic is trying to use its nuclear programme as a bargaining chip to end the varying degrees of international isolation it has

been forced to endure since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Unquestionably, most Iranians want to find a way to end economic sanctions so that the country could use its vast oil wealth—an estimated $ 10 billion surplus this year—to fix the country’s infrastructure among other ills.

Iran views its uranium enrichment programme in conformity with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it is a signatory. Article IV of the NPT provides any signatory “an inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” and to acquire technology for this purpose from other signatories.

New Facility Project
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has inaugurated a new facility producing uranium fuel for a planned heavy-water nuclear reactor. The West fears the reactor could eventually be used for producing a nuclear weapon. President Ahmadinejad has announced the plant's opening during a ceremony in the central city of Isfahan. Two years ago, Tehran officially declared that the first batch of low-enriched uranium required for the production of fuel for nuclear reactors had been produced at the Natanz nuclear facility in Isfahan.

The plant will produce pellets of uranium oxide to fuel the heavy-water research reactor, which is scheduled to be completed in 2009 or 2010.

However, Iran denies any intention to build a nuclear weapon. The US and its allies have expressed concerns Iran could reprocess spent fuel from the heavy-water reactor into plutonium for building a warhead. The process is distinct from uranium enrichment, which produces fuel for a light-water reactor. Highly enriched uranium can be used to build a warhead as well. Iran's enrichment program presents more immediate concerns to the West than the hard-water reactor, because it is far more advanced.

The announcement was made when the US announced it would participate directly in group talks with Iran over its nuclear program, another significant shift from former President George W Bush's policy toward a nation he labeled part of an axis of evil.

Divided Opinion
The Iranian nuclear programme has divided the world community into two parts — some countries believe in the right of any nation to develop its own nuclear technologies, whereas others insist on their absolute transparency. As a result, the former support Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whereas the latter doubt that its nuclear programme is strictly civilian.

The Iranian issue has become so urgent that from December 2006 to March 2008, the UN Security Council adopted three resolutions on Tehran’s nuclear programme. It imposed sanctions against Iran, and then toughened and extended them. Some Iranian nuclear experts are barred from foreign countries, accounts of a number of Iranian companies and banks have been frozen, and shipments are subject to inspection.

Each resolution gave Iran 90 days to come to its senses, curtail its nuclear programme, and return to the negotiating table. A special UN Security Council committee was supposed to monitor the sanctions against Iran in relation to its nuclear activities.

But, to repeat, the world is split on this problem. Chairman of the said committee, Johan Verbeke, admitted recently that only less than half of UN members have submitted compulsory reports on their compliance with the Security Council resolutions on Iran. He said that he received reports on the implementation of the first resolution from 88 countries, and of the second one, from only 72. This is not much considering that the UN consists of 190 plus nations.

Enriching Uranium
Iran has a plan to install 6,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium. These are IR-2 centrifuges in Iran’s classification, and their productive capacity is two and a half times higher than that of their predecessors — first generation P-1s. What does this mean? If 3,000 P-1 centrifuges can enrich enough uranium for one nuclear bomb in three years, their successors, with double the number, will do the same at least five times faster.

Iran has not bought a single complete IR-2 counterpart abroad, and new generation centrifuges are practically made entirely of Iranian materials and components. Therefore, there are no grievances against Iran — merely concerns, which are bordering on strong suspicions. The problem is Iran’s reluctance to comply with the UN resolutions and stop all uranium-enrichment activities. Iran argues that it has the right to develop its own nuclear technologies as a participant in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It is believed that the Iranian nuclear paradox stems from different interpretations of the NPT, which no longer corresponds to today’s realities. It proclaims that “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination… ”

It transpires that the treaty does not give clear-cut recommendations on the adoption of commitments by its members that would prevent a switch from peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the production of nuclear weapons.

Assessment
Despite its hardline credentials, the Ahmadinejad administration, it appears is open to negotiations.
Ahmadinejad’s recent announcement of Iran’s success in enriching uranium to reactor grade level is part of that strategy: a signal that “Iran has achieved what it can, and is now prepared for talk,” albeit from a position of strength.

The present situation presents an ex cellent opportunity to negotiate a nuclear restraint agreement with Iran, under which it stays within the
NPT framework, and performs pilot scale en richment under strict International supervision, and within the constraints of intrusive Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In nuclear politics, every action is justified by the response it provokes. The US explains its missile defence programme by claiming that other States are developing new weapons system, which one day it might need to shoot down. In response, Russia has activated a new weapons system, the Topol-M, designed to penetrate the US anti-missile defence. Israel, citing the threat from Iran, insists on retaining its nuclear missiles. Threatened by them, the Iranian President said that he wants to wipe out Israel off the map and appears to be developing a means to do so. And so it goes on. Everyone turns out to be right in the end.

The assertive new generation leadership in Iran is less likely to accept an unfair compromise with the west. But the matter of the fact is not a single permanent five of Security Council has made any move towards disarmaments. Their threats to pre-emptive bombing and their quiet development of new weapons systems guarantee the failure of the both the UN and IAEA.