Recently, India and France signed a nuclear deal, under which France would provide two nuclear plants to India. The increasing Indian nuclear tendency raises several significant questions regarding security of the nuclear program. India has always been censuring Pakistani nuclear program so as to divert the global attention from the threats posed by its own nuclear program.
All Indian nuclear installations are situated in the eastern part of the country, where several separatist movements, including naxalites (Maoist guerrillas), are on their zenith. Similarly the Indian missile installations are situated either in the areas affected by naxalites or in those areas where Hindu extremists are active. Neither is the Indian Government's writ established nor is the Indian law enforced in 90 percent of these areas. The area has, rather become a no-go zone for the Indian Government.
Grim Situation
Koteshwar Rao, a Maoist leader, has recently claimed that they would get independence before 2050. If the naxalites can stop the Indian security forces from coming in any area, they can also blackmail the entire world by occupying the nuclear installations and material. According to the Indian Government sources, Uranium Processing Plant, Uranium Corporation of India Limited, Tiljer Heavy Water Plant, and Institute of Physics Jharkand are situated in the area where naxalites have complete control and their activities are at a premium.
Most of the Indian missiles installations are in Chandigarh, where the Sikh separatists, under the banner of Babar Khalsa are running an independence movement. Similarly, the reserves of Prithvi ballistic missiles are in the disputed valley of Jammu and Kashmir.
Ajit Dowel, former director of the IB [Intelligence Bureau], says that there are strong possibilities that naxalites direct their attention to illegal trade of uranium in order to enhance their resources. There are several people in the circles of the Indian nuclear scientists who are sympathetic to the naxalites, and provide covert support to the naxalites in using and illegal trade of Uranium. M. Mahalingam, scientist at Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant Karnataka, was one of them. Mahalingam mysteriously disappeared in June 2009, and his body was found in a pond a few days later.
It was presumed that he had committed suicide. In fact, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), the Indian intelligence agency, had arrested Mahalingam for suspected links with the naxalites. However, he died as a result of the third degree torture during interrogation.
Illegal Trade of Nuclear Material
India has made no special security arrangements for its nuclear installations. Therefore, its installations meet accidents every now and then. The incident at Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant is one of these. In this incident, 90 officials fell ill as a result of drinking radiated water. In the nuclear installations throughout the country, 134 untoward incidents occurred during the 1990s. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board claimed in 1998 that 28 incidents had occurred in nine power stations. However, none of these incidents was of a serious nature.
Illegal Trade of Nuclear Material
India has made no special security arrangements for its nuclear installations. Therefore, its installations meet accidents every now and then. The incident at Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant is one of these. In this incident, 90 officials fell ill as a result of drinking radiated water. In the nuclear installations throughout the country, 134 untoward incidents occurred during the 1990s. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board claimed in 1998 that 28 incidents had occurred in nine power stations. However, none of these incidents was of a serious nature.
Nevertheless, the fact is that plants were shut because of fire eruption in five of these incidents. In one of the incidents, a scientist died when poisonous gas spread in a heavy water plant. Atomic pilfering, smuggling of nuclear fuel and mysterious deaths of scientists have become a regular feature of Indian nuclear plants and installations.
The Mumbai police arrested three people with large quantities of uranium on 7 December 2009. Similarly, the Bihar police arrested a group of smugglers near the Nepal's border on 19 February 2008. The police recovered 4-kg of uranium from their custody. The West Bengal police arrested two people and recovered more than 200 gm of semiprocessed uranium on 27 August 2001. The Mumbai police recovered 8.3-kg of uranium on 1 May 2000.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the police arrested eight people on charges of involvement in illegal trade of nuclear material on 13 November 2008. Three uranium rods were also recovered from their custody. According to the IAEA sources, the Indian police recovered 57 pounds of uranium on 7 November 2000, and arrested two people for illegal trade of nuclear material.
All these incidents prove that Indian Nuclear Energy Commission does not have complete control over nuclear material. Moreover, its monitoring system is also quite deficient. As far as smuggling of nuclear material and the relevant resources is concerned, India is not behind any country. According to the CNN report of 26 January 2003, NEC (Naranjo Engineering Consultants) engineers, an Indian company, sent 10 consignments to Iraq, including very sensitive tools for the nuclear plant. Indian nuclear installations are threatened by the terrorists as well.
Security Measures
Fire erupted mysteriously in Bhabha Atomic Research Center on 29 December 2009. Later investigations proved that goons from the racket of Chhota Rajan, a Mumbai underworld don, had set it ablaze in collaboration with some less known serving as well as expelled police officials. Such incidents cast further doubts regarding the Indian nuclear program and nuclear installations. These incidents also raise questions as to how the United States and the Western countries can sign deals with India, in spite of such security arrangements of nuclear program.
These incidents are slap on the face of the Western media persons and governments. These incidents prove that Indian nuclear installations and reserves, rather the entire infrastructure, is highly insecure, and possibilities that extremists might gain access to it are far greater as compared to that of Pakistani nuclear infrastructure. India cannot boast the security measures of its nuclear program and its insecurity is a food for thought for the IAEA and also for the entire world.
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