Crisis in Tunisia

The overthrow of the Tunisian regime, which prompted authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Bin Ali to flee the country on 14 January 2011, is an unprecedented event among Arab countries. In its short history, the Arab world -- which abounds with autocratic regimes -- has experienced many military coups that toppled the existing ruler and replaced him with another strongman.

However, in recent decades, military coups have nearly disappeared as a result of stronger internal security apparatuses; growth in the size of armies, which has made organizing military coups more difficult; and pervasive mass media. A battalion commander can no longer carry out a coup by taking over a radio station. In the Tunisian case, and for the first time, an autocratic regime was toppled as a result of a popular uprising.

The Problem
The Tunisian regime fell because it lost control over mass demonstrations that began when an unemployed university graduate working as a peddler set himself on fire after police confiscated his cart. Throughout the demonstrations, the abundance of media channels and the subversive use of the internet played an important role, as in the demonstrations in Iran more than a year ago. Regimes in the Middle East no longer have a monopoly on the mass media, which makes it difficult for them to withhold information and maintain their rule. The internet was also an important conduit for the waves of responses from other Arab countries.

What happened in Tunisia, the home of the Arab world's first oppressive and security regime, could be repeated in other Arab countries. Nobody managed to contain the widespread angry street protests which took on a social quality that soon changed into one of politics par excellence forcing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country. The crisis in Tunisia is open to all possibilities now that the protesters against hunger and political oppression broke the barrier of fear never to look back behind them. Ben Ali's confession that he understood the people's anger and that his entourage misled him when they did not tell him the truth about the facts on the ground came to no avail.

Indeed, the fall of the regime in Tunisia fomented discontent among the public elsewhere in the Arab world, where those at the helm are generally alienated from the masses. In various Arab countries, protestors have rallied in support of change in Tunisia, spouting defiant rhetoric against the regimes of their own countries. This phenomenon was particularly blatant in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya.

Outcome of Democratic Elections
Nonetheless, it is hard to foresee the outcome of democratic elections in Tunisia after such a long period of autocratic rule, which has prevented the populace from expressing its genuine inclinations. True, the exiled Islamic movement leader declared that his movement would not run its own presidential candidate in forthcoming elections, apparently aware of the difficulty in building a political infrastructure for elections in such a short time.

However, the parliamentary elections could reveal Islamic leanings that were concealed during the previous regime, especially in rural areas outside the large cities. This means that free elections, if they are in fact held, could produce a model of a functioning democratic regime or, alternatively, demonstrate the success of the Islamic movement in taking over an Arab state through democratic elections.

Arab World's Reaction
Possible reactions in the Arab world to the Tunisian events should be examined in two time frames. In the short term, the demonstrations and protests in some Arab countries could escalate to the point that the regimes would be hard pressed to control them. This scenario pertains primarily to situations in which the regimes use too much force, causing bloodshed and a chain reaction. At this point, it seems that the regimes in most Arab countries have a great deal of experience in controlling situations where the crowd is whipped into a frenzy, and, therefore, they could manage these events and quell unrest.

Indeed, against the successful example, at least in the short term, of Tunisia is the failure of the mass demonstrations in Iran in 2009, which were firmly suppressed by the Iranian Islamic regime. In any case any regime that wants to suppress a popular uprising at the outset will face a dilemma about how much force to use. Too much force at the start of a demonstration is liable to spark a counter-response that will bring about a more wide scale uprising. However, a response that is seen as sluggish is liable to project a lack of firmness on the part of the regime and encourage those involved in the uprising.

Demand of Situation
There are urgent demands of the situation and steps that politicians, partisans, and former statesmen propose to emerge from the bottleneck. They include:

* An integral modernization program and practical recommendations by an independent and neutral royal commission headed by national figures from several backgrounds who enjoy a high executive proficiency to address the overall tension on all paths through bold recommendations applied within time frames.

* The formation of a national unity government headed by a prime minister who enjoys an executive experience in state administration capable of speaking to the people on the street and not only to the elite, and the outside.

* To come up with effective mechanisms to engage with the independent institutions, which have grown over the past years. It is not enough that the finance minister should say that the budgets of these institutions will be subjugated to the Bureau of Accountancy. Most of them should be rather merged, or included in existing ministries.

* To disengage the existing interest-propelled relationship between the government and former and new parliamentary figures who chose to bounce toward the Fourth Circle instead of respecting the role played by the authority that resides there to restore respect for the Council of Representatives.

* To admit that the street movements are spontaneous, propelled by the interests of the people, and not forced by internal or external parties that do not want what is best for this country.

* To reduce the sales tax and apply the income tax in a cumulative manner, and to incriminate the widespread tax evasion.

* To fight corruption and corrupters from the bottom to the top and not to settle with referring the files of petty bribes or announcing that the Anti-Corruption Commission recalled four companies in connection with the Mawarid Corporation to investigate suspicious activities.

* To enhance the right to obtain information and to encourage the fourth authority to fulfill its oversight duty, instead of applauding the uninterrupted mistakes.

* To set up a national security council headed by the king to adjust the pace of the state's institutions to a strategic tune countering the flood of fateful challenges. The job of the aspired for council will be to offer advice and guidance to the state's head; in other words, it will act as the "state's central brain" that bears the responsibility of long-term planning and drawing strategies for the various sectors. Its plans must be binding to all the transient governments whether in the fields of politics, economy, and even counter-terrorism and peace-making. Reviewing Jordan's political hypotheses and building new conceptualizations responding to variables require a state's basic and integral political and security team to take part in drawing the higher policies and visions.

It has become evident today that this state of popular anger is irrevocable and will not recede unless essential measures are taken to bridge the gap of confidence and regain respect of the state. The essence of this movement is the miserable living conditions and the government's persistent use of the security therapy to quell social violence and alleviate people's daily suffering. Such measures have never been proven successful in any age at any time.

The consecutive governments have only known the policy of extending their hands into people's pockets oblivious of the poverty pockets and the rising violence and tension.Once clear strategies are instated, and new redlines are drawn within a clear vision, the train will still be on track to destination despite the change of persons in the driver's cabin. Otherwise, the confusion will continue to be the overwhelming trait of all policies inflicting a loss on the state and its entire components.