Ten years later, there is still an aura surrounding the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC). People remember where they were when they heard about it.
The United States immediately refused an offer of assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the defense alliance whose Article 5 states that an attack on one member is an attack on all of them. NATO has not been the same since. The United States later used its airpower to bomb the Taliban and Al-Qaida's regular forces to bits. That was also a resolute act that was carried out without any significant presence on the ground in Afghanistan, and which did not provoke any particularly strong protest.
Eliminating Terrorism Menace
The decisive action in the period immediately after 11 September was an act of speech, that of defining the situation as war. And then there was a war, against Iraq. The justification that the United States gave for going to war was not correct; there was no tie between Al-Qaida and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as the United States had alleged, and people knew that. When this became known to the public in the country that is the US main ally, the United Kingdom, it cost social democrat Tony Blair his job as prime minister. US public opinion hardly reacted at all.
But there was some protest. One of the critics, interestingly enough, was a razor sharp analyst named John Mearsheimer. "If you are the strongest guy in the street, why stand on the rooftop and shout it out," he asked. If US military power is absolutely superior to that of other states, why throw away a huge amount of resources, which could advantageously be deployed elsewhere, on something that cannot possible be of vital national interest?
Now, in 2011, when the war in Iraq alone has cost the United States more than the war in Vietnam, and it seems quite unclear what the benefits have actually been, there are many more people asking the same question. But when it was essential to question the war, Mearsheimer and a few other skeptics stood completely alone. In Europe, a majority of us asked whether Al-Qaida was what the Germans call duellfähig, worth a duel, with the world's strongest state by far. Would not a police operation have been a reaction that was considerably more in proportion to the situation, and considerably better suited to get results?
Deterioration in Quality of Life
That question remains valid. Others have been added to it. The main question now being asked is how to get out at the least possible cost. The costs have already been far too high. The whole tone of US politics, and to some extent that of European politics as well, has become increasingly edgy and security-oriented. This is a deterioration in quality of life that affects us all.
The US warfare has been costly, not only in human lives and in financial terms, but also politically. The United States has managed to preserve the decisively important alliance with Saudi Arabia, and officially at least, working relations with Pakistan have been maintained, but over the last ten years, the United States has become even less popular among wide sectors of the population in the Middle East. For Americans, there is now even more reason to ask the question: "Why do they hate us?" than there was in 2001.
When the United States chose to define relations with radical Islam as war, this led to extended effects in all of Christendom, and in the entire Islamic world, the Ummah. Before 9/11, we in Norway talked about "immigrants." Now we talk about "Muslims." One precondition for the events of 22 July was the steadily growing tension between these imaginary quantities in the decade before. Here we have two examples of a general tendency that cannot be explained by 9/11, but which cannot be considered in isolation from 9/11 either.
US Ties With Central Players
With regard to the United States' place in the world in general, 9/11 seems chiefly to have strengthened and accelerated already existing tendencies. The US shift away from Europe toward the rest of the world has been obvious. The United States is, therefore, not overly concerned about NATO being weakened. Tensions between the United States and the other central players on the world stage, particularly China and India, have become bigger. These two states were dissatisfied with their ranking and influence before 9/11, and after ten years of growth, they are even more dissatisfied.
The border between India and Pakistan has consolidated its position as one of the places where a war in Asia could break out; it is probably the most likely place. No one now talks triumphantly about the United States being the strongest empire in world history, as many Americans did before 9/11. Nevertheless, the United States is still the strongest state by far in military terms and will remain so for some years to come.
The candidate for the most important repercussion of 9/11 is related to the polarization in relations with Muslims and in relations with China and India, but it is more general in character. After the United States' behavior at Guantanamo and in Abu Ghraib, it is more difficult for Washington to speak from a human-rights perspective.
Western Hegemony
After the unsuccessful campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is more difficult to credibly claim that US political and economic systems can be forcibly exported. Taken together with China's and India's steadily strengthening positions, this means that the West's ascendancy in global politics has been considerably weakened.
In the future, the "war on terror" may be seen as an important stage in the windup of Western hegemony. 9/11 was a terrible tragedy. The "war on terror" was a failed reaction to it.
The United States immediately refused an offer of assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the defense alliance whose Article 5 states that an attack on one member is an attack on all of them. NATO has not been the same since. The United States later used its airpower to bomb the Taliban and Al-Qaida's regular forces to bits. That was also a resolute act that was carried out without any significant presence on the ground in Afghanistan, and which did not provoke any particularly strong protest.
Eliminating Terrorism Menace
The decisive action in the period immediately after 11 September was an act of speech, that of defining the situation as war. And then there was a war, against Iraq. The justification that the United States gave for going to war was not correct; there was no tie between Al-Qaida and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as the United States had alleged, and people knew that. When this became known to the public in the country that is the US main ally, the United Kingdom, it cost social democrat Tony Blair his job as prime minister. US public opinion hardly reacted at all.
But there was some protest. One of the critics, interestingly enough, was a razor sharp analyst named John Mearsheimer. "If you are the strongest guy in the street, why stand on the rooftop and shout it out," he asked. If US military power is absolutely superior to that of other states, why throw away a huge amount of resources, which could advantageously be deployed elsewhere, on something that cannot possible be of vital national interest?
Now, in 2011, when the war in Iraq alone has cost the United States more than the war in Vietnam, and it seems quite unclear what the benefits have actually been, there are many more people asking the same question. But when it was essential to question the war, Mearsheimer and a few other skeptics stood completely alone. In Europe, a majority of us asked whether Al-Qaida was what the Germans call duellfähig, worth a duel, with the world's strongest state by far. Would not a police operation have been a reaction that was considerably more in proportion to the situation, and considerably better suited to get results?
Deterioration in Quality of Life
That question remains valid. Others have been added to it. The main question now being asked is how to get out at the least possible cost. The costs have already been far too high. The whole tone of US politics, and to some extent that of European politics as well, has become increasingly edgy and security-oriented. This is a deterioration in quality of life that affects us all.
The US warfare has been costly, not only in human lives and in financial terms, but also politically. The United States has managed to preserve the decisively important alliance with Saudi Arabia, and officially at least, working relations with Pakistan have been maintained, but over the last ten years, the United States has become even less popular among wide sectors of the population in the Middle East. For Americans, there is now even more reason to ask the question: "Why do they hate us?" than there was in 2001.
When the United States chose to define relations with radical Islam as war, this led to extended effects in all of Christendom, and in the entire Islamic world, the Ummah. Before 9/11, we in Norway talked about "immigrants." Now we talk about "Muslims." One precondition for the events of 22 July was the steadily growing tension between these imaginary quantities in the decade before. Here we have two examples of a general tendency that cannot be explained by 9/11, but which cannot be considered in isolation from 9/11 either.
US Ties With Central Players
With regard to the United States' place in the world in general, 9/11 seems chiefly to have strengthened and accelerated already existing tendencies. The US shift away from Europe toward the rest of the world has been obvious. The United States is, therefore, not overly concerned about NATO being weakened. Tensions between the United States and the other central players on the world stage, particularly China and India, have become bigger. These two states were dissatisfied with their ranking and influence before 9/11, and after ten years of growth, they are even more dissatisfied.
The border between India and Pakistan has consolidated its position as one of the places where a war in Asia could break out; it is probably the most likely place. No one now talks triumphantly about the United States being the strongest empire in world history, as many Americans did before 9/11. Nevertheless, the United States is still the strongest state by far in military terms and will remain so for some years to come.
The candidate for the most important repercussion of 9/11 is related to the polarization in relations with Muslims and in relations with China and India, but it is more general in character. After the United States' behavior at Guantanamo and in Abu Ghraib, it is more difficult for Washington to speak from a human-rights perspective.
Western Hegemony
After the unsuccessful campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is more difficult to credibly claim that US political and economic systems can be forcibly exported. Taken together with China's and India's steadily strengthening positions, this means that the West's ascendancy in global politics has been considerably weakened.
In the future, the "war on terror" may be seen as an important stage in the windup of Western hegemony. 9/11 was a terrible tragedy. The "war on terror" was a failed reaction to it.
