Spreading Naxal Terrorism

With the beginning of the 2009 general elections, the frequency as well as the ferocity of naxal attacks is increasing in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar. Of late, the naxalites have particularly targeted mining areas, not only to make an easy picking, but also to pull down symbols of economic importance.

The administrative set up is weak in these states and the presence of tribal populace provides a base. They have not only been able to scare voters enough to heed their boycott call, but have also been looting explosives with impunity. That is a chilling reminder that they may be able to cause more killings and kidnappings in the days to come.

Even as the circumstances in which 11 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnels were killed in the Nalco siege in Orissa were being confirmed, there came news of Naxal attacks elsewhere: two Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) men killed on April15 2009; 10 policemen and five election officials on the day after. That is 28 officials in four days — more than the entire number of policemen killed in the Mumbai attacks. That’s more than what the security forces sustain fighting terrorists and insurgents in Kashmir and the North-east.

Operating with Impunity
These attacks may not be so dastardly as some other Naxalite crimes such as brazen slaughter of special police inside their camps in Chhattisgarh or the massacre of Andhra’s “greyhounds” sailing on Chilka lake on the way back home after completing a counter-terrorism mission in Orissa, but they cannot be dismissed lightly. They underscore that Naxal terrorists can operate with impunity. No matter how brazenly heinous their crimes, none of them has even been arrested, leave alone being punished. This is so despite the thundering announcements of “massive manhunts” to bring the guilty to book.

Many people other than the victims are somewhat indulgent to these Maoists because their violence has socio-economic overtones. Some see them as protectors of tribals that are usually exploited and oppressed by forest contractors and others enjoying official patronage. But doesnot this run counter to the fundamental doctrine that no cause can be a justification for terror?

Targeting Elections
The naxals are also targeting the candidates as well as the election machinery. They had recently killed a BJP leader and a village head in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh.

Campaigning in most affected areas is confined to urban pockets. Yet, no concerted strategy has been evolved to tackle them. Since police drives are launched in a piecemeal fashion, the maoists quietly disappear from the area of operation and strike somewhere else with impunity. What is needed is a joint campaign in all the 13 States where the naxalites have been active.

States’ Response
Some States have responded strongly — so much so that their anti-Naxal measures have critics worrying about human rights abuse. But those state governments are at least clear on who the enemy is. Orissa, on the other hand, prefers fighting an insurgency on the cheap. Though Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik claims that 15 of Orissa’s 30 districts are Naxal-affected, his weak government has done an abysmal job of enforcing the law and ensuring order. The 11 jawans from the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), killed in Koraput — an unusually high death toll given the parameters of the attack — are only the latest in a steady stream of police casualties from Orissa. In Nayagarh in 2008, 13 policemen were slaughtered when Naxals laid siege to the district armoury.

Consequences of Government Strategy
These are the consequences of Government strategy that tries to fight Naxalites on the cheap. It took the Mumbai attack to impose some semblance of accountability on the office of the Union home minister; but there has been little indication from the Centre that any corrective has been put in place for Shivraj Patil’s waffling on Naxalites. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has in the past asserted that Naxalism was the single biggest internal security threat that India faced; but this fight has, essentially, been bequeathed to the Government that takes office in May2009.

Recall: when the entire Naxal leadership was surrounded in the Andhra forests, early on in the UPA government’s tenure, it was a call from New Delhi that saved them. Some states have been less cavalier; human rights activists may rightly demand that charges of excesses be investigated, but at least the Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh Governments have taken the threat seriously.
Nothing much can be expected in terms of a corrective to the messy state of affairs now that the country is in the throes of Lok Sabha elections. But it is to be hoped that whoever comes to power in May will attend to this much-neglected task more difficult. At the same time, the Government must ensure the backing of the local people who feel alienated because of lack of development.